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Introduction
Now that a decade has passed since the 9/11 attacks, it is worth contem-
plating the ever-growing possibility that terrorists, rather than a sover-
eign state, could trigger the first modern-day detonation of a nuclear 
weapon. For well over a decade, al-Qaida and similar violent extremist 
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organizations have communicated their interest in using nuclear weapons 
against the United States or its allies. Even though this potential threat 
does not come from a nuclear-armed state, the risk of a future nuclear 
attack is real and menacing. Despite this fact, the means of deterring 
nuclear-armed terrorists and the role of the U.S. nuclear arsenal are 
largely misunderstood.2
Many strategists and policymakers continue to spend significant time and 
energy thinking about the possible actions of terrorists, including those 
who may become nuclear-armed. This is understandable considering 
there is enough weapons-usable nuclear material worldwide for an esti-
mated 120,000 nuclear weapons, and much of this material remains 
unprotected.3 Consistent with the view of many analysts, the 2010 U.S. 
National Security Strategy states:
"[T]here is no greater threat to the American people than weap-
ons of mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pur-
suit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their 
proliferation to additional states."4
Al-Qaida and similar extremist organizations are considered the groups 
most likely to want nuclear weapons.5 The Strategy goes on to note that 
securing vulnerable nuclear material is paramount because, according to 
current assessments, terrorists are determined to buy, build, or steal a 
nuclear weapon.6 To address this threat, the United States is leading an 
effort to secure all vulnerable or loose nuclear material by the end of 
2013.7 Moreover, the international community has acknowledged the 
threat of nuclear terrorism. In April 2010, over 45 countries participated 
in the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. in order to arrive at a 
common understanding about the threat of nuclear terrorism. A second 
summit will be held in the Republic of Korea in 2012.
Terrorists do not necessarily share the same goals or need the same capa-
bilities as states. In many cases, a terrorist organization may consider a 
low-yield detonation a success for its intended purpose. According to esti-
mates, a ten-kiloton nuclear detonation in an urban environment could 
kill tens of thousands of people and level buildings within half a mile, 
while structures between a half-mile and a mile away would experience 
significant destruction.8 In general, a violent extremist organization may 
become nuclear-armed in primarily two ways. First, it may buy or steal a 
nuclear weapon that has fallen out of state control. Second, it may build 
an improvised nuclear device using widely distributed designs, after hav-
ing acquired the necessary nuclear material to do so.9 As has been said, 
nuclear material may be bought, stolen, or acquired in some other way. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5  No. 1
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss1/6
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.1.2</p>Deterring and Dissuading Nuclear Terrorism
17
With Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan having transferred 
nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya, some terrorist orga-
nizations may be able to more easily acquire the technology and material 
to fabricate an improvised nuclear device.10 Acquiring nuclear material, 
however, is not the final step in an act of nuclear terrorism. A potential 
attacker must still have the expertise to assemble the nuclear device, 
transport and store it, get the weapon to its intended target, and achieve a 
nuclear detonation.
Deterrence Theory
In a frequently cited definition, deterrence is "persuading a potential 
enemy that it is in his own interest to avoid certain courses of action."11 
The underlying tenet of nuclear deterrence theory, a subset of general 
deterrence, is that the credible and potentially overwhelming force of 
using nuclear weapons against any would-be adversary is sufficient to 
deter most potential aggressors from employing nuclear weapons. More 
importantly, it has been noted, "Given that deterrence can only work, 
when it does, in the minds of enemy leaders, it is their worldview, not 
ours, that must determine whether or not deterrence succeeds."12 There-
fore, to deter a potential adversary, we must deter its leadership.
At the heart of the nuclear deterrence concept lies a paradox. If nuclear 
weapons are used, deterrence has failed, and yet establishing a credible 
deterrence capability requires planning for its intended use. For the 
United States, it is only by maintaining an effective and credible nuclear 
strike capability and planning for its use against an adversary that deter-
rence is possible. Thus, some of the most destructive weapons of war—
nuclear weapons—can, in fact, be used to promote peace and stability.
According to the "2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review Report," the primary 
role of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is to deter a nuclear attack on the United 
States, as well as on allies and partners.13 It is therefore U.S. policy that as 
long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will sustain a safe, 
secure, and effective nuclear arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries 
and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners they can count on 
America's security commitments.14 Although the current U.S. administra-
tion wishes to reduce the country's nuclear arsenal, it is trying to do so 
without affecting the reliability and effectiveness of its nuclear weapons, 
including their deterrent effect.15 Thus, nuclear weapons are still thought 
to play a fundamental role in deterring potential adversaries, especially 
those who are nuclear-armed.
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But, alas, deterrence is at times limited. For example, when "the chal-
lenger is not dispassionate, well-informed, or reasonable, as frequently 
has been the case in historical experience, deterrence cannot be assumed 
to function predictably."16 The theory of stable deterrence, used for 
decades during the Cold War, represents "an attempt at a Jominian solu-
tion to a problem that was essentially Clausewitzian in nature."17 So while 
stable deterrence theory may be based on elaborate calculations meant to 
"ensure" that deterrence is achieved through the deployment, threat, or 
use of nuclear weapons, these sophisticated calculations and strategic 
analyses are at odds with the fact that most conflicts and crises are deter-
mined by the "attitudes, expectations, perceptions, and behavior of antag-
onists."18 Additionally, when attempting to employ a deterrence strategy, 
the adversary's assessment of costs, benefits, and probabilities may often 
be misunderstood.19
The question is: "Can terrorists be deterred?" The Bush administration's 
National Security Strategy addressed this question by noting:
"Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terror-
ist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the 
targeting of innocents; whose so called soldiers seek martyrdom 
in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness."20
Some critics of deterrence have argued that terrorists motivated by ideol-
ogy and intending to use a stolen or improvised nuclear device against the 
United States may not care about the military repercussions; therefore, a 
terrorist organization's leadership may prove undeterrable by military 
means.
In contrast to this view, others have observed that the proposition that 
terrorist organizations and their leadership represent undeterrable foes 
seems at best a half-truth.21 At times, and under the right conditions, the 
credible threat of overwhelming force may dissuade terrorist leadership 
from pursuing direct confrontation or initiating an attack.
Law of Armed Conflict
Classical deterrence theory works only if there is a credible threat of 
retaliatory force. What is considered a credible use of force within the U.S. 
defense community is typically governed by the Law of Armed Conflict. 
While not directive or preventive of any future action, the ideas and 
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principles within the Law of Armed Conflict are relevant when 
considering a response to terrorism, including to the actions of nuclear-
armed terrorists.
The Law of Armed Conflict has been defined as the part of international 
law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities.22 It is based on two 
main sources: customary international law arising out of hostilities and 
binding on all states; and international treaty law arising from interna-
tional treaties, which binds only those states that ratified a particular 
treaty. The purpose of the Law of Armed Conflict is to reduce the damage 
and casualties of any conflict; protect combatants and noncombatants 
from unnecessary suffering; safeguard the fundamental rights of combat-
ants and noncombatants; and make it easier to restore peace after the 
conflict's conclusion.
Of the principles contained in the Law, two are most germane to potential 
military actions following an act of nuclear terrorism. These are the prin-
ciples of military necessity and lawful targeting. The first, military neces-
sity, calls for using only that degree and kind of force required for the 
partial or complete submission of the enemy, while considering the mini-
mum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources.23 This principle is 
designed to limit the application of force to that required for carrying out 
lawful military purposes. Although the principle of military necessity rec-
ognizes that some collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians may 
occur when a legitimate military target is attacked, this does not excuse 
the destruction of lives and property disproportionate to the military 
advantage to be gained.24
The second principle, lawful targeting, is based on three assumptions.25 
First, a belligerent's right to injure the enemy is not unlimited. Second, 
launching attacks against civilian populations is prohibited. Third, com-
batants must be distinguished from noncombatants in order to spare non-
combatants injury as much as possible. Consequently, under lawful 
targeting all "reasonable precautions" must be taken to ensure that only 
military objectives are targeted in order to avoid, as much as possible, 
damage to civilian objects (collateral damage) and death and injury to 
civilians (incidental injury).26
Key to applying the principle of lawful targeting is distinguishing between 
military objectives and civilian objects. Civilian objects include places of 
worship, schools, hospitals, and dwellings, but these can lose their 
protected status if they are used to support military action. While an 
attacker should not intentionally assault civilians or employ methods or 
means that would cause excessive collateral civilian casualties, a defender 
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is obligated to separate civilians and civilian objects from legitimate 
military targets. Failure to separate them may lead to a loss of their 
protected status.
Discussion
The application of the principle of military necessity to any potential U.S. 
military response following an act of nuclear terrorism means that any 
military response, including nuclear, should not exceed the kind or degree 
of force needed to accomplish the military objective. Therefore, if a low-
yield nuclear weapon is detonated within the United States, the most 
appropriate U.S. response to accomplish the military objective might be 
to employ a similar low-yield nuclear weapon. If, for whatever reason, a 
commensurate low-yield nuclear weapon was not readily available, 
national leadership likely would need to weigh other options for achieving 
the military objective, such as whether to employ a higher-yield nuclear 
weapon or conventional weapons with a similar kiloton destructive effect. 
A higher-yield nuclear response, however, could exceed the degree of 
force needed to accomplish the military objective and, therefore, be in 
violation of the Law of Armed Conflict. On the other hand, responding 
conventionally to a nuclear attack likely would limit future deterrence 
efforts.
In applying the principle of lawful targeting, the selected target for any 
nuclear response should be a military objective, in order to minimize col-
lateral damage and incidental injury as much as possible. It is worth not-
ing that in the latest Nuclear Posture Review statement, the United States 
renews its commitment
"to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-
state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or 
use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financ-
ing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts."27
This statement threatens retaliatory force against either state or non-state 
actors. As others have noted, however, picking an actual target for a mili-
tary response following an act of nuclear terrorism could prove problem-
atic, since non-state-sponsored terrorists may not have clear geographic 
boundaries, making it difficult to avoid death and injury to civilians. This 
exact problem is why many strategists and policymakers have long argued 
that deterrence is ineffective against terrorist leadership, since a credible 
U.S. response following an act of nuclear terrorism may not be viable.
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Counterarguments
There are several possible counterarguments to the contention that deter-
rence is ineffective against terrorist leadership. Some might argue that the 
United States would not be bound by the Law of Armed Conflict following 
an act of nuclear terrorism because terrorists are unlawful combatants 
who do not, as a matter of course, follow its provisions. After all, unlawful 
combatants are by definition individuals who directly participate in hos-
tilities without being authorized by a governmental authority, and non-
state-sponsored terrorists fall in this category. Nevertheless, any U.S. 
response to an attack by nuclear-armed terrorists—that is, by unlawful 
combatants—should follow the Law of Armed Conflict's tenets. Indeed, 
the Law addresses terrorist actions by noting that unlawful combatants 
who engage in hostilities are in violation of the Law of Armed Conflict and 
in doing so become lawful targets. Consequently, they may be killed or 
wounded and, if captured, may be tried as war criminals for their actions.
Some critics might also argue that since nuclear terrorism is a form of 
asymmetric warfare, the United States must adapt any potential response 
by holding at risk those objects the terrorists value most. In the case of 
religious extremists, potential targets could include places holding special 
religious or cultural significance. Therefore, the argument goes, if non-
state-sponsored ideological extremists attack the U.S. homeland with an 
improvised nuclear device, the United States should attack places of reli-
gious and cultural significance, including those within metropolitan cen-
ters. A credible threat of such a U.S. response against religious and 
cultural centers would therefore deter ideological extremists. Holding at 
risk a potential adversary's religious and cultural centers, however, goes 
against the principle of lawful targeting, since the response may not dis-
criminate between military objectives and civilian objects, because the 
targeted places of worship and religious centers would be considered 
civilian objects under most circumstances. Even when considering the 
legitimate use of reprisals in response to enemy actions that are noncom-
pliant with the Law of Armed Conflict, an act of reprisal still cannot delib-
erately target religious or cultural property.28 If these objects are used for 
military purposes, however, they lose their immunity. Additionally, if 
these protected objects are located near lawful military objectives, which 
the Law of Armed Conflict prohibits, they may suffer collateral damage 
when the nearby military objectives are lawfully engaged.
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A Holistic Strategy of Prevention
The goal of a strategy seeking to prevent an act of nuclear terrorism is to 
cause a terrorist organization's leaders to determine that such an act will 
fail in achieving their desired objectives and, therefore, decide not to pur-
sue the nuclear attack. While the credible threat of a military response is 
necessary for effective deterrence, any means available to support this 
goal of prevention is a viable component of a suitable strategy. Other suit-
able means could include nonmilitary activities if they support discourag-
ing a potential adversary from pursuing an act of nuclear terrorism. Thus, 
an overall strategy of prevention should use both military and nonmilitary 
approaches that include integrated and layered activities. Such a strategy 
represents a more holistic approach to dealing with the threat of nuclear 
terrorism. The military and nonmilitary activities supporting the goal of 
prevention can be categorized as "deterrence" and "dissuasion."
Deterrence
The first step in establishing the most effective U.S. prevention strategy 
possible is "relearning" that deterrence remains a viable concept, even 
when attempting to address the threat of nuclear terrorism. Many terror-
ist organizations, including al-Qaida, function strategically and ratio-
nally.29 Consequently, deterrence is still viable. There is nothing within 
the Law of Armed Conflict that explicitly prohibits a U.S. nuclear response 
to an act of nuclear terrorism, even one that is non-state-sponsored. As 
long as the principles of military necessity and lawful targeting are duly 
considered, a nuclear response would still be a viable option. For exam-
ple, such an option would exist if, following a low-yield nuclear detona-
tion by terrorists within the U.S. homeland, a suitable military objective 
can be targeted using a U.S. nuclear response of degree and kind needed 
to achieve the military objective. This is not to say significant diplomatic 
efforts will not be needed before any U.S. nuclear response, especially 
since the military objective to be targeted will be located within the board-
ers of a sovereign state. In the end, the highest levels of national leader-
ship, including the president, would have to approve any nuclear 
response. Also worth noting is that a possible U.S. nonnuclear response to 
nuclear terrorism can also have a deterrent effect. By conducting persis-
tent and aggressive counterterrorism operations to seek out the most mil-
itant terrorist organizations, the United States can increase a potential 
adversary's perception that there would be a credible threat of force fol-
lowing any attack against the United States. If al-Qaida's leadership 
believed that following an act of nuclear terrorism the United States 
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would systematically seek them out and, through nuclear or conventional 
means, threaten their survival, they might be deterred from employing a 
nuclear weapon or an improvised nuclear device.
In the case of state-sponsored nuclear terrorism, the knowledge that the 
United States has the option to respond in kind to a nuclear attack can 
increase the likelihood of deterring states that knowingly provide a terror-
ist organization with, or the opportunity to acquire, a nuclear weapon or 
nuclear material for an improvised nuclear device. Therefore, in the effort 
to "hold fully accountable" any state that enables terrorists to obtain, or 
that facilitates the use of, nuclear weapons against the United States or its 
interests, the U.S. response against the complicit state may include a 
nuclear option. While the problems inherent in selecting a suitable mili-
tary objective associated with an act of non-state-sponsored terrorism 
have been noted, these problems are mitigated in a scenario involving a 
supporting or facilitating state, because there are clear geographic bound-
aries, and reasonable precautions may be taken to help ensure that collat-
eral damage and incidental injury are avoided as much as possible.
Dissuasion
The other piece of the strategy puzzle, dissuasion, aims to use a targeted 
strategy and policy to cause countries or potential adversaries from initi-
ating military action.30 To be effective, dissuasion activities must occur 
before a threat manifests itself. "Shaping activities," typically nonmilitary 
in scope and conducted during peacetime, are included in activities meant 
to dissuade potential adversaries.31 In the context used within the U.S. 
military services, dissuasion works outside the potential threat of military 
action.32 Dissuasion of current or potential nuclear-armed adversaries 
therefore seeks to convey the futility of using or proliferating nuclear 
weapons or nuclear material.33 It does so with the intent of causing a 
potential adversary to forgo a path leading to military confrontation. 
Some think that those dissuaded from competing with the United States 
should not need to be deterred.34 With respect to dissuading a terrorist 
organization from acquiring nuclear weapons, such an approach should 
focus on four aspects: interdiction, consequence management, nuclear 
forensics, and monetary interception.
Interdiction efforts meant to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
or nuclear material can succeed in thwarting a potential attacker. A signif-
icant capability in intelligence collection, detection, and identification can 
help discriminate a potential threat from nonthreatening materials com-
ing through ports or across boarders. Surveillance supporting nuclear 
interdiction efforts can focus on known transit and smuggling routes, 
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monitor choke points of commercial trade, and utilize standoff nuclear 
detection technology. All of these interdiction activities are meant to 
impede the proliferation of nuclear weapons or nuclear material, as well 
as slow and make more costly access to sensitive technologies, material, 
and expertise.
Preparations in consequence-management efforts, such as those dealing 
with emergency medical response, humanitarian assistance, and disaster 
relief operations following an act of nuclear terrorism, could make a 
valuable difference in the level of societal destruction and personnel 
casualties. These preparations seek to mitigate the consequences of an act 
of nuclear terrorism. In cases where it is questionable whether a nuclear-
armed terrorist group can be deterred, past analyses suggest that a 
relatively austere emergency medical response, humanitarian assistance, 
and disaster relief measures can provide the highest initial return on the 
dollar for protection across a broad spectrum of plausible nuclear threats. 
Some have estimated that it may be possible to turn the death rate from 
ninety percent to twenty or thirty percent simply by being well-prepared 
in advance for a potential nuclear event.35 To minimize the impact of a 
nuclear terrorist attack, the U.S. National Response Framework and other 
documents outline interagency roles and responsibilities to guide 
consequence-management activities. Post-detonation consequence-
management activities, which would be conducted concurrently with any 
civil-military humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, 
include securing the incident site, assessing the radioactivity at the site, 
enhancing first responder capabilities, providing radiological medical 
triage capabilities, and increasing population resilience and recovery 
capabilities.36
Developing a responsive nuclear forensics capability is the third aspect of 
dissuading nuclear terrorism. Nuclear forensics is the science of deter-
mining the source and pathway of a nuclear weapon or nuclear material 
after it is interdicted or detonated. Following a nuclear or radiological 
attack, post-detonation nuclear forensics activities likely will be under 
pressure and time constraints to perform quickly. The Nuclear Forensics 
and Attribution Act seeks to strengthen U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security efforts to develop nuclear forensics capabilities that would help 
attribute the source of nuclear material.37 A robust and well-known capa-
bility to identify the source of nuclear or radiological material intended 
for, or used in, an act of terrorism could, it is thought, dissuade prospec-
tive proliferators or those supporting nuclear terrorism.38 Furthermore, 
the threat of effective attribution following the science of nuclear foren-
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sics could lead to improved security at other countries' nuclear material 
storage facilities, thereby preventing the unwitting transfer of nuclear or 
radiological materials.
The last aspect of dissuading nuclear terrorism involves aggressive efforts 
to intercept and minimize funding sources used by militant extremist 
groups. Funding is critical to sustaining the activities of most terrorist 
organizations. In the past, such funding has come through charities, 
illegal activities, and front companies. Persistent multinational fiscal-
interdiction efforts could significantly reduce the funding available to 
support any potential nuclear terrorism activities. These monetary 
interception efforts could include targeting transactions supporting 
terrorist organizations, whether conducted by states, nongovernmental 
organizations, or private entities. Economic efforts to thwart nuclear 
proliferation might focus on the potential suppliers of nuclear or 
radiological material.39 A sustained effort to eliminate or minimize 
funding sources used by terrorist organizations could help curtail future 
recruits for the organization's cause. This in turn might lead to a sense of 
futility within the organization. Combined monetary efforts such as this 
could dissuade a terrorist organization's leaders from pursuing a path of 
direct confrontation through nuclear terrorism.
Conclusion
In today's security environment, the threat of nuclear terrorism remains a 
persistent concern. While some strategists and policymakers have opined 
that nuclear-armed terrorists are undeterrable and deterrence is ineffec-
tual against non-state actors, the demise of deterrence's role in U.S. strat-
egy has been overstated. Because the leaders of most terrorist 
organizations, including al-Qaida, are rational and function strategically, 
they can, in fact, be deterred to some degree. Moreover, when dissuasion 
works with deterrence as part of a broader strategy of prevention, the 
United States is better able to employ a holistic approach that seeks to 
cause a violent extremist organization's leaders to decide for themselves 
not to pursue an act of nuclear terrorism.
To be capable of deterring a range of potential threats, the United States 
must maintain an effective and tested nuclear arsenal, which frequently 
will require modernization. Furthermore, the country must have a suit-
able range of nuclear weapons that can deliver minor to severe military 
damage, depending on the scenario. Considering the Law of Armed Con-
flict's implications, the U.S. nuclear arsenal should include low-yield 
weapons in order to give the president the best range of response options 
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to an act of nuclear terrorism. If tactical, low-yield nuclear weapons are 
not maintained in the arsenal, it will be harder to convey to a would-be 
aggressor that the United States has a credible nuclear response to an act 
of nuclear terrorism using a low-yield weapon or improvised nuclear 
device. While the present U.S. administration advocates retaining and 
modernizing some of the lowest-yield nuclear weapons, implementing the 
plan remains uncertain because of continuing budgetary pressures.
History suggests that deterrence will at times fail due to miscalculation, 
uncertainty, or chance. This may also be the case for deterrence of 
nuclear-armed terrorists. If deterrence fails and an attack occurs, having 
aggressive programs in place to manage the consequences of a nuclear 
detonation could reduce or limit the damage. A side benefit of a strategy 
incorporating nuclear deterrence and dissuasion against nuclear terror-
ism is that potential nuclear-armed adversaries may be deterred or dis-
suaded because they know the United States can offer a decisive military 
response, while managing the consequences of a nuclear attack and inves-
tigating and determining the attack's source if not immediately known.
A strategy incorporating both deterrence and dissuasion can make great 
strides in preventing an act of nuclear terrorism, but only if national lead-
ers make it a top priority. Many Americans regret that more was not done 
to improve counterterrorism capabilities and strategies before the 9/11 
attacks, especially since many of the needed improvements seemed obvi-
ous afterwards. Similarly, the United States needs a sound and compre-
hensive strategy to deter and dissuade nuclear terrorism. To wait until 
after such an attack would be unforgivable.
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